Disparate markets:
Language, nation, and education in North India

During the 1960s, the government of India created an educational requirement known as the “three-language formula” in an effort to facilitate communication between different linguistic regions. School boards, as part of a “syllabus” legitimating schools, began to require that precollege students study three languages, the particular combination of which would vary by region. During fieldwork conducted in 1996–97 in Banaras, a city in North India, I found no one familiar with the requirement or its purpose, although every student had been subjected to it for a generation. I learned quickly, however, that people in Banaras use language distinctions as a convenient shorthand for talking about education, the nation, and one’s future.

In this article, I explore the lack of resonance between ideological underpinnings of official policy, on the one hand, and understandings in Banaras of relationships between language, schooling, and the nation, on the other hand. I do so to show that such notions as “Hindi,” “English,” and “India” are transformed as the situated knowledges through which they attain meaning shift. I outline the three-language formula, foregrounding its unifying principle, and then offer an ethnographic exploration of schooling in Banaras, illustrating its dichotomizing tendencies. Residents of Banaras who send their children to school in the city identify many schools by their “medium,” that is, the language used in most classroom interaction. They believe that Hindi and English form an opposition, setting students, families, and employees along different social and economic trajectories. Discourse about medium always includes reference to one or both of two options: Hindi, imagined as India’s “national language” (raṣṭrabhaśā), and English, imagined as an “international language” (antarrāṣṭrabhaft). Yet I wish to avoid creating an essentializing dichotomy between national official policy and local knowledge in Banaras. I describe the ways in which Banaras can be characterized—without recourse to the three-language formula—by its lack of ability to provide a quality education. Questions of language again loom large. Some relatively elite people living in Banaras have decided to have their children schooled elsewhere because they find schools in Banaras generally unable to provide students with the ability to
To understand the Indian government's efforts toward linguistic integration, one must consider their ideological underpinnings. Webb Keane describes the attraction a national language holds for a national government: "The notion of a 'rational' and 'modern' national language rests on claims to a universality that transcends local particularities" (1997:46). The Indian government is no stranger to a desire to "transcend local particularities," but it has never tried to do so by focusing on a single language.

Many scholars offer accounts of the debates and struggles over a national language that occurred within the young nation's political sphere. Jyotirindra Das Gupta (1970) describes Mahatma Gandhi's desire that Hindustani replace English in importance and become the national language but notes that increasingly salient associations of Hindi with a Sanskrit-derived lexicon and Devanagari script and of Urdu with Muslim separatism, Nastaliq script, and a separate Pakistan made these languages' incorporation by Hindustani impossible to realize. Paul Brass (1990) notes that Hindi alone stood as a viable option for status as a single national language but that non-Hindi-speaking states' governments objected vehemently to its imposition. A compromise ensued with an agreement that Hindi would become the sole official language in 15 years (by 1965). Several events made the transition impossible, and another compromise in 1965, becoming the Official Languages Act in 1967, guaranteed that English would be retained as an "associate official language."

On the heels of these language debates, the Education Commission, also known as the Kothari Commission, devised a unifying plan in keeping with India's then-official multilingual mandate. From 1964 to 1966, the commission included within its national policy on education a plan for the linguistic integration of the nation. Known as the "three-language formula," the plan mandates the teaching of a combination of three languages in the pre-university curriculum. The formula's goal is to achieve national unity by creating multilingual citizens, specifically, ones equipped with languages of other regions in the nation.

The formula's ideological viability presupposes a process of language standardization relevant to the ethnographic context presented below, in that not all languages spoken in Banaras are represented in schooling. Michael Silverstein writes that any form considered "standard is endowed with claims to superiority as a 'superposed' register for use in those contexts of interaction that count in society" (1996:286). John Gumperz locates the standard within a three-tier model for the large Hindi-speaking region in which Banaras is located. He sees (1) a more or less unified phonological, morphological, and syntactic system constituting a standard; (2) more regionally delimited languages within the area of the standard; and (3) phonological distinctions within single villages (Gumperz 1958, 1961, 1964). Educational domains and occupations

Three languages, a nation's formula

To understand the Indian government's efforts toward linguistic integration, one must consider their ideological...
for which schooling is required banish nonstandardized linguistic varieties (Gumperz’s second and third tiers). In turn, knowledge that standardized forms are appropriate in educational domains far exceeds institutional boundaries. For example, in Banaras, people with no school experience whatsoever found the idea of teaching in Bhojpuri, a language characteristic of Gumperz’s second tier and known to and spoken by a vast majority of Banaras residents, to be utterly ridiculous. When I inquired further, people consistently contrasted the standard or “pure” (shuddh) Hindi used in schools, banks, and government offices with Bhojpuri, considered a “house language” (ghar ki bhasha) or “village language” (gav ki bhasha).

In a related vein, the association of standardized forms with official contexts can “erase,” in the parlance of Susan Gal and Judith Irvine (1995), complex pragmatic phenomena made possible by the dual use of standardized Hindi and languages like Bhojpuri. Gal and Irvine note that an arena of linguistic practice is erased when it is masked or hidden by the ideology of another. Beth Simon (1993) offers an example in recounting a conversation she witnessed in Banaras between a disgruntled clothes washer (dhobi) and his customer. Although the washerman primarily speaks in Bhojpuri, he uses Hindi when mimicking the voice of his former employer, who had begged him not to leave Delhi to return to Banaras. In Banaras, Bhojpuri is generally understood to connote care and concern. When used with Hindi, Bhojpuri can highlight Banaras as a gentler place than other locales, where Bhojpuri can stigmatize its speaker. The use of Hindi to express a Delhi employer’s care and concern for the washerman cleverly reverses the language’s assumed position vis-à-vis Bhojpuri, such that the washerman’s customer is shamed. Standardized languages exclude such interactions from official contexts. Education makes a few constitutionally recognized standardized languages into emblems of the nation.

The three-language educational formula was developed in the wake of several successful claims that regional language difference should determine state boundaries. The national government slowly and begrudgingly allowed the formation of new states whose cases for legitimacy rested largely on linguistic evidence. Thus, the Nehruvian government divided Telegu-speaking from Tamil-speaking Madras in 1953, Marathi-speaking from Gujurati-speaking Bombay in 1956, and Punjabi-speaking from Hindi-speaking Punjab in 1966.

This is not to imply that all such claims have been successful or that state-recognized languages are always recognized by the national government. For example, a movement to have the Maithili language area in the northern part of the state of Bihar recognized as a separate state failed, and the languages recognized by the state government of Sikkim do not all appear in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. My goal in this section is to explain ideology of linguistic unity at the level of the national government. Its relationship to local levels is, no doubt, varied. For example, particular dilemmas discussed later in the article are typical of Banaras, and dilemmas in locales in a place like Sikkim likely differ radically.

Despite such vicissitudes, two standardized languages differ from those associated with state boundaries. Hindi predominates in several states, some highly populated, covering a vast geographic area in the northern part of the country. The national government had little worry about fracture in the Hindi-speaking area; regional languages (such as Bhojpuri), some with associated literary genres and substantial numbers of speakers (such as Maithili), were understood to be “dialects” of Hindi, already mutually intelligible with the standard. English, unlike Hindi, is not associated with any particular region but, rather, with urban, educated, upper-class people. This situation posed a dilemma for language planning, evidenced by the explicit mention of both languages in the commission’s report:

At the secondary stage, the State Governments should adopt, and vigorously implement, the three language formula which includes the study of a modern Indian language, preferably one of the southern languages, apart from Hindi and English in the Hindi speaking states, and of Hindi along with the regional language and English in the non-Hindi speaking states. [National Policy on Education 1968:xvii]

The formula represents “unity in diversity,” a Nehruvian motto that, Brian Axel (2002:236) argues, continues to inform the Indian government’s representations of the nation. One need look no further than the formula’s encoding of diversity, however, to understand why serious disagreements arose among the states about the fairness of its implementation. Although the formula establishes states as the administrative units for linguistic legitimacy in India, it cannot implement a one-to-one connection between states and languages. The “Hindi-speaking states” compose the axis on which the formula is built. Whereas a “southern language” (Kannada, Malayalam, Tamil, or Telegu) should be taught in school in a Hindi-speaking state, Hindi alone should be taught in all non-Hindi-speaking states (including northern states such as West Bengal, Gujurat, Maharashtra, Orissa, and Punjab). Indeed, a few state governments (esp. that of Tamil Nadu in the south) fiercely objected to the teaching of Hindi in their schools (Ramaswamy 1997). The formula includes a built-in contradiction to its encoding of linguistic diversity by means of state identification. Nevertheless, the formula continues to mandate, at a national level,
that every student should acquire a trio of languages in school.15

**Schools in Banaras and the three-language formula’s lack of salience**

From October 1996 to October 1997, I conducted fieldwork in Banaras, a city of approximately two million in North India. Banaras is known within and outside of India for its Hindu holy sites, including the Viswanathan Temple, cremation grounds, and ghats, or steps, leading from the Ganges River up to the city. Lawrence Cohen describes a much-stereotyped view of the city from a boat in the Ganges: “The scene—river, ghats, lanes, boats, and bathers—is clichéd. It has come to stand in for the city as a whole in a variety of registers: religious, touristic, sanitary, scholarly” (1998:9). Less familiar to outsiders is the geography of pleasure that many of the city’s residents describe as unique to Banaras. Nita Kumar (1988, 2001) recounts residents’ descriptions of the Ganges as a space of recreation, the bank across the river from the city as a space of relative freedom, and the lanes of the city as spaces of carefree movement.

From the vantage point of precollege schooling, however, Banaras resembles the cities around it, including Allahabad, Gorakhpur, and Patna. Although rural areas surrounding these cities are agriculturally less efficient and generally more impoverished than rural areas to the west—toward Agra, Delhi, and Punjab (Gupta 1998; Wadley 1994)—the cities themselves offer a wide array of school options. In Banaras, and in other cities in North India, people reckon with or place individual schools into many categories: central (administered by the national government from Delhi), convent (administered currently or previously by Christian organizations), government (administered by the government of the particular state in which the school is located), private (administered by an individual, family, or organization that owns the school), madrassa (in which students learn the Koran and the tenets of Islam), Montessori, and so on.16

Initially, I focused my research activities on three schools. A combination of my personal relationships and the schools’ administrative affiliations made the three suitable choices. My landlady’s two daughters attended what I call the Saraswati School. A friend of my landlady introduced me to the school principal who, in turn, introduced me to several teachers and gave me permission to attend classes and talk to teachers and students. The principal explained that her dominion is the first floor of the school, serving grade levels 9 through 12, comprising half of the school’s approximately 1,600 students. Later, she introduced me to the principal of the coeducational school of the same name, which is located upstairs and serves grades one through eight. The principal of the upstairs primary and middle school explained that hers is a private school that charges students fees and whose board affiliation differentiates it from the one downstairs. Many schools across North India have their syllabus approved by a board that administers exams in April, at the end of the school year. The downstairs school maintains affiliation with the UP Board, the educational board controlled by the state government of UP from its education headquarters in Allahabad. The upstairs school is affiliated with one of the many private, multistate boards in North India.

Both principals explained that most of the students attending the two schools lived in New Colony, the neighborhood in which I resided. New Colony had been planned decades before as one of Banaras’s posh neighborhoods. Several circumstances thwarted its realization as such, including an influx of lower-middle-class residents—among them the family with whom I lived—who built modest houses in the lanes behind the colony’s boulevard, the growth of a slum area on the very edge of the neighborhood, and flooding in the colony’s boulevard with the onset of each monsoon. The student body of the schools reflected the lower-middle-class nature of the neighborhood. Most of the students came from families wherein the breadwinner, usually the father, was employed as a merchant, a secretarial worker, or a low-level civil servant.

The third school in which I started fieldwork early on I call the Seacrest School. I was introduced to the owner and principal of the school by her sister, a friend of mine from earlier trips to Banaras. One of the principal’s first comments to me was that Seacrest maintains strict standards by virtue of its affiliation with the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) and that affiliation with the CBSE justifies the school’s extremely high fees. The school, located approximately two kilometers (about 1.2 miles) west of sleepy New Colony, lies just off one of southern Banaras’s most heavily trafficked intersections. Indeed, most of the students take rickshaws or are driven to school from locations all over southern Banaras. Seacrest students’ transportation habits generally reflect their superior class positions as well as their more widely dispersed residential origins vis-à-vis students attending both levels of the Saraswati School. The school has four branches with a total of nearly 10,000 students (approximately 2,000 are enrolled in the branch near New Colony), making it a Banaras-wide institution.

I began fieldwork at the beginning of October, a little over a month after the school year had begun. Thus, roughly from October to April, and, again, from late August to October, I was able to visit schools while they were in session. During the first two months of fieldwork, I spent each day from Monday through Friday in one of the three aforementioned schools. I attended classes,
audiotaping classroom interaction after my presence had become less awkward, talked to the principals and teachers during their breaks, and talked to students between classes and during recess. After school, I accompanied students on their daily treks to buy cheap snacks and refreshments at a local stall or store where we could linger and talk about school, life circumstances, and ambitions. Weekends and the summer break provided me with opportunities to visit principals, teachers, and students’ families outside of school. These breaks also provided opportunities for me to travel to Delhi to visit schools and talk to officials employed by or retired from educational boards.

After a couple of months, I spent two days a week visiting other schools in Banaras, trips sometimes requiring a rickshaw ride to distant parts of the city. Thus, from this point until the end of fieldwork, I spent one day a week in each of the original schools. These visits gave me further exposure to the wide array of pedagogical goals, bureaucratic affiliations, and socioeconomic backgrounds of students represented in Banaras schools. Among the schools I visited was St. Joseph’s School, located on the western outskirts of the city. St. Joseph’s is a coeducational private convent school affiliated, like Seacrest, with the CBSE. I also visited several schools affiliated, like the downstairs level of the Saraswati School, with the UP Board. These schools vary in grade levels as well as in gender inclusion. Some are for girls, some for boys, and some are coeducational. I visited many schools without board affiliations. These included two madrasas, differentiated by Islamic sectarian distinctions, as well as a school run by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, an organization with complex ties to political groups that have called for the realization of an essentially Hindu India (Basu 1996). These schools, not affiliated with a board, also included several voluntary schools, most of them located in or near slum areas, that try to accommodate extremely poor students by offering flexible hours, school supplies, and pedagogical techniques in keeping with the needs of those who attend, such as the provision of basic literacy skills.

Knowledge of the government’s language policy for schools is largely absent among the city’s residents, regardless of social, economic, or professional position. Not one person in Banaras with whom I talked during a year of field research knew of the three-language formula. I asked about it often, and the first reaction of many was to reply simply that a student has to study three languages in school. Indeed, the most common way that students reflected on multilingual pedagogy was to complain about having to learn more than one language. They did so in interviews with me as well as in conversations with their peers. Much more common, however, were complaints about math, physics, biology, or some other science. Not until I visited Delhi, the nation’s capital, did I meet someone who knew about the formula explicitly. A retired administrator of the CBSE explained the details of the formula exactly, including its date of ratification. When I told her that no one I had met in Banaras seemed to know about the formula, she used my report to launch a general diatribe about the poor quality of schooling outside of the capital.

In Banaras, the three-language formula has had an effect on schools’ language requirements because, in every school that I visited, the curriculum included instruction in three languages. A consideration of which languages, however, quashes the idea that the national government’s ideology of national integration has been successfully implemented. In all of the schools that I visited in Banaras, Hindi and English were two of the three languages offered. The third language was most often Sanskrit, although, at a few schools, some other northern language was taught—Bengali, Urdu, and so on. No school that I visited offered any of the four southern-based Dravidian languages specified by the formula. A school in one neighborhood, I was told, offered Telegu, a Dravidian language, but the language primarily served to maintain the residents’ already established competence. Banaras’s situation is reflected more generally in Brass’s (1990:143) discussion of the problems that the Indian government has encountered in implementing the three-language formula, including finding teachers competent in the required languages who are willing to move to other regions. I would only add that I was aware of schools in Banaras that had teachers competent in a Dravidian language and capable of teaching it as the third language in the formula. The southern languages, however, were never taught; Sanskrit or another northern state’s language always took their place. Thus, although teaching three languages has become a taken-for-granted aspect of school curricula in Banaras, the national government has been ineffectual in inculcating the ideology that communication with southern states via a southern language might benefit the nation.

**Laddu and toffee**

The ironic interchange described below illustrates the kinds of ideological constructions of language, nation, and citizen that are salient to Banaras residents. In it, students and parents reflect on a ritual at school and draw from several spheres of meaning to criticize the national government. Christopher Pinney argues that criticism is typical of reflections on the Indian government in public discourse: “The sense of a state which is not adequate to the needs of its nation is a recurrent trope in recent Indian public culture” (2001:29). Participants in the episode described here criticize the government,
confirming Pinney’s assertion, but do so through its institutional embodiment as one half of a dichotomy, itself structured by education. Their comments demonstrate that a “sense” of the government’s inadequacies varies with constructions of nation, citizen, and language.

I had just attended the Saraswati School’s Saraswati puja. Saraswati is the Hindu goddess of learning and knowledge (see Figure 1), and, in recent years, the puja, or festival, in which she is worshipped has grown in popularity and has come to be associated with students (Kumar 1988:219). I headed for a tea stall to join two friends, Ramesh and Ashish, whom I had met during previous visits to Banaras. As I approached the tea stall, I spotted my friends as well as the stall owner’s wife and her three daughters. I had come to know the three girls well, seeing them daily at the downstairs school from which I had just come, and, less frequently, helping their mother at the stall after classes. The three girls were still in their uniforms, having, like myself, just arrived from school. I greeted my two men friends, exchanged a smile with the stall owner’s wife, and sat on the stall’s bench.

The woman distributed tea as her youngest daughter blurted out, “Did you get laddu?” [Laddu mil gaye hai?]. Everyone laughed, myself included. Many times during my morning walk to the Saraswati School, students had called out, “Laddusu!” (which, in Hindi, means “like a laddu” [a sweetmeat], and is also my last name, LaDousa). My name had become a pun throughout the neighborhood. I answered that I had, whereupon Ashish remarked wryly, “I pay this much money and my son only gets toffee” [Itna paisa dete aur hamare larke ko siri toffi milti hai]. Ashish mentioned money because his son attended the Seacrest School, for which fees are extremely high, in contrast to the girls’ government-administered downstairs section of the Saraswati School. All smiled when Ramesh, single with no children, returned, “Yes, but one does not get sick from eating toffee” [Ha lekin toffi khane se bimari nahi hoti]. The stall owner’s wife added with a grin that “things of the government” (sarkar ki cisê) are “things of sickness” (bimari ki cisê). The comment was less cryptic to my friends than to me because they laughed heartily whereas I politely and belatedly joined them.

On further reflection, I realized that distinctions within and across several spheres of meaning helped make the joke work. Ashish introduced the issue of cost. Toffees cost roughly fifty paise, or one-half of one rupee (at the time of my fieldwork, approximately 36 rupees equaled $1), making them a cheap treat for children to enjoy after school. Ashish had brought his son to the stall several times dressed in his school uniform, and everyone at the stall was aware that Ashish was talking about the distribution of toffees by his son’s school for the puja. A laddu

Figure 1. Saraswati, the Hindu goddess of learning, at her puja. Photo by C. LaDousa.
costs more than a piece of toffee. The price of a laḍḍu, depending on its type, ranges from one and one-half to severa rupees. Ashish’s comment establishes as ironic distribution by the Hindi-medium government school of the more expensive laḍḍu for the puja (see Figure 2).

Other distinctions, however, were at play to enable the final joke-making allusion to health. A switch in parameters of difference created an ironic reversal, and the image made all present laugh. Laḍḍu is a part of the larger food group mitthāi (sweetmeat), which includes perishable and locally produced items; indeed, the laḍḍu distributed at the Saraswati School were made by students on the premises. “Fresh” (taḍā) and “hot” (garam) are some of the attributes that make such sweetmeats particularly delicious. Toffees, in contrast, are produced in a factory and have rather long shelf lives; their production is seemingly standard, precluding their involvement in the aesthetic judgment open to sweetmeats. Irrelevant in the case of toffees is critique or praise that points to the time expended since production, quality of ingredients, and techniques of production, storage, and display.

Ramesh replaced the idiom of cost with that of health by noting that laḍḍu opens its consumer to risk. Laḍḍu may be more expensive or more desired than toffee, but it is also more dangerous. Ramesh’s comment could be construed as inappropriate given that the laḍḍu is received by students as prasād, a gift from the goddess Saraswati “marking” students with her auspicious substance (Marriott 1976). Wrapped pieces of toffee are far less effective conduits of the goddess’s blessing than an unwrapped laḍḍu. Thus, Ramesh, like Ashish, had reversed the logic of the puja by noting that a laḍḍu exposes its consumer to harm that is obviated in a piece of toffee with its mass-produced origins. The stall owner nailed home the conflation of the local with the governmental by attributing to it the risk of illness that the consumption of sweetmeats entails. Although consuming the local (laḍḍu) temporarily might seem like the better deal because it is more expensive and delicious, in the long run the nonlocal (toffee) is a safer bet.

Hindi- and English-medium schools

The dichotomous image built in the above interchange introduces the bifurcated manner in which languages and schools are mutually imagined in Banaras. Important to Banaras residents is whether a school is Hindi-medium or English-medium, medium, again, referring to the language in which most classroom activity is conducted. When people in Banaras talk about schools, they often cast as

Figure 2. Receiving laḍḍu at the Saraswati School’s puja downstairs. Photo by C. LaDousa.
oppositional schools like that of the tea seller’s three daughters, the Hindi-medium Saraswati School, and that of Ashish’s son, the English-medium Seacrest School. The two schools constitute extreme possibilities along an axis of language ideologies, focused on language medium.

The language divide among schools is paralleled by differences of administrative control and financing: Hindi-medium schools are usually less expensive and under government administration via the UP Board whereas English-medium schools usually charge higher fees and are affiliated with one of the private administrative boards. The most prestigious English-medium schools in Banaras are affiliated, like the Seacrest School, with the CBSE. Paraphrasing D. L. Sheth (1990), Rajeswari Rajan describes the “dual system” as “the existence of a small number of expensive public schools where English is the medium of instruction from the lowest classes, along with (a preponderance of) regional-language schools, for the most part run by governments or municipalities, where English is taught—badly—as a subject for a few years” (1992:19). The issue of cost in the interchange about treats, for example, evokes the heavy subsidies that government-administered schools receive and that greatly reduce the amount of “fees” (tuition) required monthly for attendance. Many Hindi-medium schools in Banaras, such as the Saraswati upstairs section, are private and do, indeed, charge fees, albeit never quite as much as charged by the most expensive English-medium schools (such as that attended by Ashish’s son). Yet, in discourse about medium, the Hindi-medium schools that charge fees and the English-medium schools that are nearly as expensive are usually forgotten. Government-administered Hindi-medium schools and the most expensive private English-medium schools exemplify a major duality. Government-administered Hindi-medium schools that charge a few rupees a month are contrasted with privately owned English-medium schools that charge roughly 300 rupees a month.

The process through which Hindi- and English-medium school identities are constructed relationally is born out of two phenomena, one comprising pan-Indian language ideological shifts, and one evident locally, in the way Banaras residents talk about schools. First, the opposition prompted by the mention of a school is informed by an increasingly salient linguistic opposition between Hindi and English in Indian society. Richard Fox (1990) has identified the formation of a new identity, “Hindian,” that comprises a mix of the lower-middle classes and urban forward castes. Since the mid-1970s, the group so identified has felt increasingly threatened by rural class mobility, employment reservations for traditionally disadvantaged groups, and remittances that Muslims receive from relatives who work in the Gulf states. For the Hindian, the Hindi language—with a lexicon derived from Sanskrit (not Persian or Arabic, which for many people renders the language Urdu)—has become an icon for Hindu nationalism (hindutva), a project destined to undo the damages wrought by partition and secularism.20

Fox explains that English (as well as Urdu) provides Hindi and Hindu nationalism with an image of the alien transgressor.21 Indeed, Franklin Southworth argues, “The new Hindi [with a Sanskrit-derived lexicon] as developed by pandits and politicians, is one of the most important tools in the struggle to oust English from its position of importance in government, commerce, and elsewhere” (1985:232). Krishna Kumar (1991a) explains that English-literate elites have been unconcerned with Hindi’s increasing Sanskritization and association with an essentially Hindu nation and that their lack of attention has exacerbated the increasing ideological divide between themselves and those Fox identifies as Hindians.

Providing the divide yet another site of articulation, Gauri Viswanathan argues, is the decision in accordance with the national education policy of 1996 to build a Navodaya school in each district of the country. Competitive and residential, the schools were to repair the urban–rural divide in education structured by English and Hindi, respectively. In keeping with the three-language formula’s plan for national integration through diverse knowledge, 16 students from each school were to be relocated to other, mostly rural areas of the country. Viswanathan points out, however, that Navodaya schools have provided further impetus to the idea that study in English enhances “worldly, empirically derived knowledge” whereas study in indigenous languages enhances “narrower, self-absorbed learning” (1992:33). Navodaya schools, thus, transpose an urban association with the possibility of English-medium education onto rural areas. The “split public” seen by Arvind Rajagopal (2001) as a product of the divide between Hindi and English newspapers also parallels the split between Hindi- and English-medium schools.

In local conversations, as in the one about treats from the goddess recounted above, the very mention of a Hindi- or English-medium school can invoke the other medium as its opponent. Just as Hindi’s ties to Hindu nationalism and opposition to English have become more pronounced since the 1970s, so, too, has Banaras residents’ awareness that institutional growth reflects competition between languages, economic aspirations, and modes of nationalism. Kumar argues that, since the 1960s, “the growth of private schools gradually siphoned off the children of the better-off sections of the urban society from state schools” (1996:61). In countless conversations, people told me, “An English-medium school has been built in each and every gully” [Ek ek gali me angrezi midiam skul ban gay hai]. The refrain reflects ideological shifts noted by Fox as well as changes initiated by the liberalization of the Indian economy in the 1980s. Education in English
has become a contested mark of distinction in increasingly complex class-informed pursuits (Chakravarty and Gooptu 2000; Mankekar 1999).

Taken together, these statements speak to the proliferation of English-medium schools that take fees and their increasing opposition to Hindi-medium schools in which tuition is heavily subsidized by the government. In a defensive posture that resonates with Fox's "Hindian," many Hindi-medium students told me that Hindi is their "mother language" (mātra bhāsā) or "national language" (rāṣṭrabhāsā) and that English is spoken by people "like you" (jaise āp), by "foreigners" (videsīyā). English-medium students, in contrast, consistently noted that English is an "international language" (antarrāṣṭrabhāsā) required for entrepreneurial success. Vicissitudes of praise and criticism, however, were not easily predicted, and yet they maintained the oppositional character of medium designation. In opposition to English-medium schools, Hindi-medium schools could be praised as patriotic and modest or disparaged as backward and stagnant; in opposition to Hindi-medium schools, English-medium schools could be praised as cosmopolitan and generative of opportunity or disparaged as unpatriotic or a foolish waste of money (LaDousa 2002).

From English-medium to a kind of English

Although most people living in Banaras send their children to the city’s schools, a small number find it necessary to send their children away for schooling. The case of my neighbor demonstrates that not everyone in Banaras focuses on medium differences within the city. Indeed, the neighbor believes Banaras to be unable to offer the kind of English that he sees as necessary for success.

The neighbor had been transferred from Delhi by the State Bank of India to train new employees in Banaras branches for three years. People in New Colony referred to this man by his occupation, calling him "Bankwalla." He told me that he had taken up residence as a paying guest of a family in New Colony because of the cheap price, allowing him to send the bulk of his income to his wife and daughter in Delhi. Much anthropological work has been focused on the exodus of residents of Indian villages to small towns or cities in search of employment or higher wages. Most of the construction workers, rikshawallas, or petty merchants who worked in New Colony (but lived elsewhere in Banaras) had moved to Banaras from villages around the city. Little work, however, has focused on people like the Bankwalla, who have been transferred to a position of authority as part of an employer’s expansion or program of quality control. Commentary about language difference is likely to figure prominently in reflections on such transfers in relation to their geographic and hierarchal repositionings.

One day the Bankwalla visited my landlady’s house while her daughter was studying in the next room with her tutor. Afterward, I accompanied him to a tea stall. He remarked that he had made the right decision in leaving his daughter in her school in Delhi, pointing out that my landlady’s daughter had needed to speak in Hindi during her English tutorial. When I suggested that there are schools in Banaras in which classroom interaction occurs in English, he replied that no school in Banaras could provide a student with the ability to speak in English without using some Hindi. He claimed that his daughter’s education was taking place wholly in English, except for Hindi taught as a subject.

I describe the Bankwalla as an elite because residents of New Colony referred to him as a "bařā ādmi," literally, a "big man." This term is hardly indicative of a fixed social category, and its use varies by perceived difference in caste (jīti), occupation, or landholdings between user and designee. When I asked neighbors or friends to qualify their frequent use of the term for the Bankwalla, however, they mentioned a cluster of reasons that included his ability to speak English, his position of authority over most other employees at the bank, and his cosmopolitan Delhi origins, unique in New Colony. With these local rationales in mind, I call the Bankwalla an "elite" because he defines a place—in this case, Banaras—as unable to provide its residents with a proper or valuable education in the form of English free of Hindi.

Disparate markets

The three ideological constructions of language, nation, and citizen described above give evidence that each emerges from a discrete "market," in the parlance of Pierre Bourdieu. In a now-classic argument, Bourdieu (1977, 1991) asserts that certain language practices can be conceptualized as conferring symbolic capital on competent practitioners. Symbolic capital emerges within particular markets that are historically contingent. Throughout history, symbolic capital has emerged within markets as various as domains of religious knowledge and practice or royal distinction and regional spheres characterized by particular socioeconomic configurations. One peculiarity of the modern state, according to Bourdieu, has been education’s ability to organize symbolic capital by training students in a particular type of language. Bourdieu explains that the educational system “has a monopoly over the production of the mass of producers and consumers [of linguistic capital], and hence over the reproduction of the market” (1977:652). Bourdieu envisions the state’s creation of a national system of education as a means to involve citizens in a unified market.

Although finding Bourdieu’s ideas useful for their placement of symbolic value at the center of language
practice, other scholars have explored cases of modern nations wherein multiple markets exist. Taking Spain as such a case, Kathryn Woolard (1985) argues that whereas Castilian is the language of government, centralized in Madrid, Catalan provides linguistic capital in Barcelona. Woolard traces Catalan’s value to Barcelona’s history of industrial production and economic viability. Leigh Swigart (2000) reflects on a speech delivered in 1998 by President Dionf of Senegal, wherein he restated a French utterance in Wolof. He gaffed, claiming to be the television viewer’s father (in his Wolof utterance), rather than the father of the nation (in his French utterance). Swigart notes that differences in reactions by Senagalese Francophones and intellectuals, who were angered by his incompetence, and nonfrancophones, who were appreciative of his use of Wolof, give evidence of different capital values existing in overlapping but separate language markets.

The three market spheres presented in this article confirm Woolard’s and Swigart’s arguments for the existence of plural markets in modern nation-states. The three-language formula, for example, constructs the nation as a language market. One’s linguistic capital is greater if it includes the ability to communicate across language lines—for instance, if proficient in a language other than that of one’s own state—and lesser if it consists only of the ability to use a single language. According to the logic of the formula, sole knowledge of one’s state language is a sign of isolation, and to teach citizens only the standardized languages of their respective states is to handicap the nation. The formula encodes the future coordination of a national marketplace in which citizens stand to accumulate profit by their ability to traverse current linguistic boundaries, demarcating predominantly Hindi and the southern languages.

In Banaras, however, the policy measure’s vision of linguistic capital has little resonance. Among schools in the city, language medium constitutes “a sociolinguistic world of imagined dichotomies” wherein Hindi-medium indexies Banaras and things Indian and English-medium indexes Delhi and things foreign (Fenigsen 1999:69). Restated in the rubrics of Bourdieu, the end points of the possibilities of medium focus the relevance of language to education within juxtaposed markets of value, one configured by Hindi and the other by English. The market for Hindi and Hindi-medium schools is the local and the indigenous whereas the marketplace for English and English-medium schools is Delhi and “beyond.”

Thus, discourse about medium not only differs from but also subverts the construction of language, education, and symbolic capital within the three-language formula. Whereas the formula envisions the copresence of languages in institutions and in the competence of students who attend them, discourse about medium envisions as discrete linguistic entities institutions, their students, and those students’ loyalties and ideological dispositions. Whereas the formula constructs national communication through linguistic plurality, discourse about medium constructs ideological competition through linguistic opposition.

The case of the Bankwalla, however, demonstrates that not everyone in Banaras finds medium distinctions to be the most salient relationship between language and nation. The Bankwalla envisions India as a language market in which English free of the influence of Hindi serves as capital. For him, Banaras emerges as a place unable to prepare students as well as Delhi, the national capital and city in which his daughter is being educated.

In many respects, the Bankwalla’s emphasis on English was mirrored by many people in Banaras who were sending their children to local schools. The potential of English to provide spatial mobility was important to Banaras residents. Many, including Hindi-medium students and their families, told me that if one wishes “to wander” (ghumna), English is a necessity. By wander some, indeed, meant travel beyond India’s borders, but, most often, students mentioned Delhi as the eventual destination for which English is required. Spatial mobility, in turn, provides opportunities for economic mobility.

Banaras residents used schooling to make moral judgments about others in complex ways that served to reinforce local configurations of Hindi and English, their symbolic capital, and their markets. Some people used the topic of mobility offered by English-medium education to launch criticisms of the desire to get a job elsewhere, noting that such desire indicates a lack of concern for one’s parents’ welfare or a lack of satisfaction with a modest life. Some parents of Hindi-medium students decried as foolish the payment by poor families of massive bribes widely known to be required for entry to English-medium schools. Nearly everyone with whom I spoke, even those who had little or no prior schooling of any sort, knew these bribes to be outrageously high, counted in the thousands of rupees. These parents consistently pointed out that without proper connections, the poor, even if armed with an English-medium education, would not be able to find employment beyond Banaras. “What is the use?” [Kya fayda hai?] many rhetorically asked.

But the English implicated in medium distinctions in Banaras and the English important to the Bankwalla do not necessarily represent the same capital. Others in Banaras share the Bankwalla’s fear that the city’s schools cannot provide an English valuable in a national market. Whereas the Bankwalla was unwilling to have his children join him in Banaras, others in Banaras were compelled to send their children away. A distant relative of the family that owns one of the most expensive English-medium schools in town, for example, explained that her own daughter was currently attending the first grade at the
school. Her husband, however, was on the verge of getting a promotion and a transfer to Delhi. There, she said, her daughter would be able to attend a much better school. She expressed relief that she would not have to suffer separation from her daughter. When I did not understand, she explained that, were her family to stay in Banaras, she would eventually need to send her daughter away to receive a better education than is available locally. I asked her what made some schools elsewhere better. She told me that attendance at university requires fluency in English, a cruel shock to all but the “most adaptable” children who do not come from the best English-medium schools. She then asked whether I had noticed that the children of the owners of her daughter’s school (the speaker’s cousins), five to seven years older than her daughter, did not attend the school. When I replied that I had not, she smiled ironically.

The relieved mother is linked to the Bankwalla by an attitude that Banaras cannot provide skills in English needed for future success. Furthermore, the shared attitude gives evidence that both belong to an elite—vis-à-vis people whose children are schooled in English-medium schools within Banaras—because they envision education elsewhere as a tool of class maintenance or mobility.

Some people uninvolved in English-medium education expressed the notion that English-medium schools in Banaras cannot provide the necessary linguistic capital to succeed in more central places. Partly as a result of her troubled teaching experiences, one woman had formed her own voluntary school for the extremely poor on the roof of her house. Most students came from a nearby slum, just a few blocks from the school.23 Such schools are known in Indian educational parlance as belonging to the nonformal education (NFE) sector. NFE schools are totally ignored in discursive practice related to modernity. Yet the voluntary school teacher, too, criticized the owners of her daughter’s school (the speaker’s cousins, who do not come from the best English-medium schools within Banaras) because they envision education elsewhere as a tool of class maintenance or mobility.

English—manages to offer capital within the market the formula envisions as linguistically plural. Although Hindi represents the nation, English provides spatial and economic mobility within it.

**Monolingual ideology and its capital**

Although an exploration of the lack of resonance between official policy and constructions of language, nation, and citizen in Banaras reveals much about the complexities of language markets in India, it is not comprehensive. In this section, I turn to published commentary to show that a market and a kind of capital exist to which people in Banaras I knew, regardless of socioeconomic or ideological disposition, had no access. By critiquing the Indian government for allowing the growth of English corrupted by indigenous Indian languages, some published authors construct the Indian nation—and not locales within it—as a disadvantaged market.25

Such criticism invokes what Woolard calls the “monolingual point of view” (1999:3). Pervasive in—but not confined to—regions once dominated by colonial powers is the strife wrought by the desire to coordinate nation and language (Errington 1998, 2001). In a well-known thesis, Benedict Anderson identifies the emergence of print capitalism as the process enabling the mutual imitation of the modern nation and a national language. Anderson describes the dilemma faced by regions dominated by colonialism: “The potential stretch of these [print language–based] communities was inherently limited, and, at the same time, bore none but the most fortuitous relationship to existing political boundaries” (1983:46). Edward Gray notes more bluntly, “Contrary to the modern nationalist conceit—the boundaries of language and government almost never match” (1999:9). Indeed, the ideological equation of “one language—one people” continues to pose “challenges” to nations and their governments, especially those once dominated by colonial powers (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994:61). Independence from colonial powers, Woolard explains, has not lifted the burden of such discrepancies: “An ideology of ‘development’ is pervasive in postcolonial language planning, wherein deliberate intervention is deemed necessary to make a linguistic variety suitable for modern functions” (1998:21). Development indicators, in turn, can be used to judge national governments as more or less successful at inculturating modernity.

Thus, the national government can become an actor whose disposition toward the relationship between language and nation is open to scrutiny. Whether a government can—or desires to—create and disseminate a unifying language can render it a success or a failure. One possibility is a nation that is envisioned—or a would-be nation whose spokespeople attempt to envision it—in terms of
a unifying language. Whether through a rhetoric of defense, revival, or creation, a language emerges, with an often-undisclosed history of engineering, to standardize citizens’ access to political information and participation.

Woolard provides an example of a city government employing monolingual ideology to counter the threat of plural languages. Although San Francisco, California, is associated with the support of pluralism generally, the city’s government passed Proposition O in 1983 prohibiting the use of languages other than English in the city’s voting practices. Capitalizing on the assumption that “‘Truth’ is more likely to come in transparent English, free of the seductive packaging of foreign languages” (Woolard 1989:272), Proposition O was able to construct monolingual elections as liberating ethnic voting blocks from their own manipulative leaders. Such events show that assumptions about the need for a single language in activities of the government may be absent in federal legislation but can be mobilized locally at crucial moments to “erase” the salience of practices felt to threaten unity.

Another possibility from a monolingual ideological perspective is a national government that fails to engineer and inculcate a national language. India is one of the most vilified examples. India’s multilingualism serves as a foundation from which much criticism has been launched both outside and within India. Kailash Aggarwal, for example, decries the use in publications—even scholarly—of such terms as “linguistic laboratory” or, worse, “linguistic madhouse” to describe India (1997:38). Some critics foreground the multilingualism of linguistic practice, especially when it is found in official contexts. For example, in an article entitled “Indish” (India + English), Khushwant Singh looks to the national government for reasons that Indians, even members of parliament, are prone to speak “linguistic ratatouille” (1986:37). The use of terms like laboratory, madhouse, and ratatouille fosters the idea that India is a place of linguistic confusion and disorder.

Some authors have written commentary published in English-language venues in India that specifies English spoken by Indians as a language whose very existence illustrates failures of the Indian government. Although none of these authors calls for the imposition of a single language in India, each uses an image of disorder to lambaste the national government and its educational system for failing to utilize and promote a legitimate language free from interference from other languages.

Such ideological positioning points to a particular group of elites that differs from others in India. Alok Rai notes, “The social presence of English in India is so varied that the notion of an English elite is self-evidently problematical” (2000:8). Heeding Rai’s warning, I argue that differences between English-literate elites in India can be identified broadly, albeit incompletely, by their access to positions in media and politics coupled with their ideological dispositions with respect to English.

I do not, of course, claim that any ideological uniformity exists among those I am calling “elite” in this section. Braj Kachru notes that authors in India who have published in English exhibit a range of ideological stances with respect to the language. Some consider English just another part of their multilingual capabilities. Others consider English an Indian language. Some authors who write in regional Indian languages such as Hindi or Marathi feel betrayed by Indian authors who have gained literary success in English (Kachru 1996). My claim is that an ideological perspective that is concerned with (and nervous about) the English spoken in India emanates from the type of elite discussed in this section, and not from others.

For example, the authors cited in this section include, in order of citation, Khushwant Singh, who has served as the editor of the Hindustan Times as well as a member of the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) of the Indian parliament; Jug Suraiya, who has been an associate editor of the Times of India as well as a columnist for many other newspapers, magazines, and journals; Romesh Thapar, who is cofounder of Seminar, a prestigious journal of national social issues; and H. Y. Sharada Prasad, who was press secretary to Prime Ministers Indira and Rajiv Gandhi. The daily English-language newspaper mentioned enjoy some of the highest circulations in India, and the political offices are situated at the highest levels of the national government. Finally, a few of the cited authors can be recognized from their best-selling books.

These elites differ from the Bankwalla and others who find Banaras unable to provide English free of Hindi, because their opinions have been published in major venues of pan-Indian distribution. Ideologically, they differ from people like the Bankwalla by virtue of their use of an international frame for discussing (and disparaging) English in India. The Bankwalla does not point to the English spoken by Indians as a specifically Indian problem. Indeed, he believes himself to speak exemplary English and regrets having to leave his daughter in Delhi to be educated in a kind of English he finds unavailable in Banaras. Thus, unlike the authors cited in this section, the Bankwalla is concerned that one’s shift in residence within India can deprive one’s child of a kind of English and the capital it provides.

In an editorial that appeared in a nationally distributed daily, Suraiya concludes, “So-called ‘Hindlish’ [Hindi + English] lacks both reach and resonance, except within its own solipsistic context” (1990). Such statements about Indian linguistic disorder are quite similar to criticisms of the public use of Spanish by Puerto Ricans living in New York City. A boundary demarcates the acceptable from the unacceptable, the legitimate from the illegitimate, and the valuable from the flawed. Bonnie Urciuoli reports that
to foster (legitimate) English among its citizens. Thompson (1986) invokes the period of the modern nation to portray an ineffectual government, unwilling and unable to produce legitimate language. Thapar, for example, associates a type of English with the nation and ascribes responsibility for it to the government: “It has to be recognized that for forty years we have refused to open our minds to the language tangle, and in so doing have fathered or mothered the bastard known as Indian-English” (1986:3). Thapar invokes the period of the modern nation to portray an ineffectual government, unwilling and unable to produce legitimate language. Prasad portrays speakers of Indian English as ignorant dupes: “Indian English could perhaps be defined as a language written or spoken by Indians in the belief that it is English” (1986:24). Variously coined “Hinglish” (referring to English spoken by Hindi speakers) or “Babu English” and “Indish” (referring to English spoken by Indians generally), Indian English can be a symptom of confusion that points to the government’s inability to foster (legitimate) English among its citizens.

Conclusion

In this article, I have explored the notion that the identification of multiple language markets in modern nations can reveal dissimilar constructions of language, nation, and citizen. Language, conceptualized as capital, presupposes different dispositions toward how the nation might be realized and how one might be implicated in its realization. The Indian government’s efforts toward national linguistic integration imagine the nation as a market in which the ability to cross linguistic boundaries embodied by federal states provides citizens with capital. Most residents of Banaras imagine the nation and the government to be embodied by an institution, the Hindi-medium school, locked in contrast to another, the English-medium school. Other relatively elite people residing in Banaras forego medium distinctions to find capital in a kind of English unavailable in local schools. Finally, elites who have had their opinions published in nationally distributed venues criticize all places in India for failing to provide capital in the form of English devoid of any trace of Indianness.

Not only are constructions of language, nation, and citizen dissimilar, but they are also uneven and imply multiple subversions and exclusions of markets. The ideological underpinnings of the government’s policy measures can be subverted by incompatible constructions of language and nation salient in Banaras, just as Banaras itself can fail to provide capital for yet other markets operative within India. From the vantage point of published authors whose commentary is cited above, all of the people I came to know in Banaras, regardless of the market in which they had found linguistic capital, were handicapped by a market that marks all Indians as speakers of an inferior English.

The dissimilar and uneven markets that I have identified confirm Thomas Hansen and Finn Stepputat’s warning that “the study... of celebration of the myth of the state and its physical representations should caution us when it comes to drawing conclusions regarding the uniformity of how the current global languages of statelessness are spoken, understood, and converted into policy and authority” (2001:36). Considered together, the markets of medium distinctions in Banaras, of those who found Banaras to be an inadequate place as well as of those whose opinions emanate from more cosmopolitan places, show that the ideological underpinnings of official language policy in India have been subverted from positions that utilize perspectives “within” and “outside” of the nation. Whether people use language to construct the nation, to facilitate movement and advancement within it, or to hold the nation to an international standard, the government’s efforts toward the creation of a national market are thwarted. By considering the dissimilar and uneven quality of language markets in postcolonial nations, scholars can avoid the reification of those who have been or might be subjected to policy measures. At the same time, they can situate the reverberations of the idea of the “nation” by attending to multiple, coexistent, and unequal constructions of the nation through language.

Notes

Acknowledgments. Fieldwork on which this article is based took place between September 1996 and September 1997 in Banaras and Delhi. The author gratefully acknowledges financial support provided by a dissertation improvement grant from the National Science Foundation. The article is an expanded version of papers presented at the 29th Annual Conference on South Asia held in Madison, Wisconsin, October 12–15, 2000, and at the 99th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association in San Francisco, California, November 15–19, 2000. Thanks go to the two audiences, but especially to Sarah Lamb, Paul Brass, and Steve Derné for critical comments and encouragement. Those who have read and critiqued previous drafts include Ann Gold, Nita Kumar, David Lelyveld, McKim Marriott, Susan Paulson, Bonnie Urciuoli, Susan Wadley, three anonymous reviewers, and Virginia
Dominguez. I found Linda Forman’s editorial suggestions superb. Any remaining errors are mine, of course. Thanks from the heart to Michael Somple. For scholarly excitement and friendship in India and beyond, thanks are in order to Bakesh Ranjan and Ravinder Gargesh. This article is dedicated to the memory of Beena Burman.

1. Mahadev Apte (1976a) gives an interesting account of the strategies different ministers of parliament used to introduce, debate, or table concerns about language legislation and parliamentary procedure.


4. For critiques of the three-language formula, see Jayaram 1993 and Srivastava 1990.

5. On the seminal attempt to map linguistic variation across (colonial) India, see Grierson 1927. For critiques of Grierson’s model and methods, see Shapiro and Schiffman 1981 and Lelyveld 1993, respectively. For an overview of many attempts to account for variation among Indo-Aryan languages and the classifications they propose, see Masica 1991:appendix 2. For an account of linguistic variation (with much more of an emphasis on sociolinguistic aspects of variation) specific to Banaras, see Simon 1986.

6. This is not to claim, however, that education provided the only vehicle for the development of standardized forms. Krishna Kumar (1990: 1247) argues that during the crucial period of Hindi’s standardization, 1880–1950, there was an explosion of magazines and literature. Francesca Orsini argues that textbooks contributed vitally to the standardization of Hindi in a gatekeeping role: “The journal expanded and validated varied and new [Hindi] literary forms and experiments, the textbook codified some as the only legitimate forms, and downplayed the others by excluding them” (2002:92).

7. The following 18 languages are listed in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution: Assamese, Bengali, Gujurati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telegu, and Urdu. Konkani, Manipuri, and Nepali were added to the Eighth Schedule in 1992. A government report on the state of languages in schools, however, lists English as one of the most important languages for use in education (Chaturvedi and Mohale 1976:43).

8. Not every new state rested on linguistic evidence for its boundary. Some exceptions include Nagaland, which became a state in 1963, nearby Meghalaya, Manipur, and Tripura, which became states in 1972, and Arunachal Pradesh, which became a state in 1987. Sanjib Baruah (1999) notes that the creation of these states partly was caused by the unsuccessful imagination of Assam as a linguistic whole. Bengalis of the Cachar region questioned whether Assamese should be the state of Assam’s official lan-

9. Other areas were subsequently joined with Telegu-speaking Andhra, including its capital city, Hyderabad, such that Andhra Pradesh became a state in 1956.

10. Robert King (1997) attributes the rather gradual formations of linguistic states to Nehru’s foresight that language might become a disintegrating feature of the Indian polity.

11. Shahid Amin cogently illustrates that India inherited this state of affairs from its former colonial ruler: “How artificial the provincial boundary was is evident from the ease with which Grierson could incorporate east UP terms into his Bihar Peasant Life” (1989:xlii). Among India’s most populated states, Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar lie in the Hindi region and with Rajasthan, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh share Hindi as the official state language. Standardized Hindi makes irrelevant the incongruity noted by Amin, the similarity of languages across the UP–Bihar state line in comparison with language in west and east UP.

12. Kamal Sridhar (1991:92) outlines the periods of students’ exposure to each of the languages: grades one through ten for the first (the language of one’s own state), five through ten for the second, and eight through ten for the third.

13. One motive for the formula’s alignment of language and state can be derived from the text itself: Education is largely in the hands of state governments. The national government, thus, was able to use state-demarcated and recognized languages to construct and manage linguistic diversity and to leave education in the hands of state governments without concern that education might serve as a site of the struggle for linguistic legitimacy.

14. Nevertheless, these battles over the formula were conducted within the formula’s parameters of the construction of states, as indicative of language distinctions. For example, Tamil Nadu conceptualized Tamil as an underdog in a fight against Hindi, the multistate, northern bully.

15. Harold Schiffman, following P. B. Pandit’s comments on the suitability of multilingualism for India, argues that the three-language formula presents the best existing match with Indian sociolinguistic realities: “A policy that recognizes historical multilingualism, linguistic diversity, and reverence for ancient classical languages is more likely to succeed in India than an imported model of any sort” (1996:168).

16. See Kumar 1998 for a larger list of school types in Banaras, and see Kumar 2000 for a history of education in Banaras.

17. For the contrasting case of Corsica, where policy initiatives are quite salient and contested, see Jaffe 1993, 1996, 1999.

18. I suspect, however, that she derived her knowledge of the policy from her rather high official post, and not from her residence in the capital, because I met many in Delhi who shared Banaras residents’ lack of knowledge.

19. The use of the term public to denote fees-taking educational institutions not administered by the government originates from the colonial period. In Banaras, I met some people who used public but many more who used private to denote such schools. Perhaps this reflects the growing presence of U.S.-centered media and of transmigration in Indian society.

20. One might argue that Hindi’s ties to Hindu identity mimics Arabic’s ties to pan-Arabic nationalism in Egypt. Niloofar Haeri notes, “Thus pan-Arab ideology overrode other ideologies on the
issue of language. The language of pan-Arabism is not the various 'divisive' and 'lowly' dialects but the unifying and standardised Classical Arabic” (1997:79). Haeri notes another Egyptian parallel with medium discourse in Banaras: In Egypt, elites often use languages other than Arabic; international linguistic capital is not made available by Arabic. What makes the case of Banaras quite different, however, is that Hindi has not been able to provide a pan-Indian symbol for the unification of Hindu identity; its reach is relegated to the Hindi or Cow Belt of North India, and it is resisted in other areas. Furthermore, medium discourse subverts wholesale the ideological underpinnings of the government’s language program.

21. Mary Zurbuchen demonstrates that political reverberations of the pronouncements of Hindians can produce ironies. For example, Mulayam Singh Yadav, former chief minister of UP, the state in which Banaras is located, initiated a campaign called “angrezi hathao” (eradicate English—a play on former prime minister Indira Gandhi’s campaign, “garib hathao” [eradicate poverty]). The chief minister’s campaign encouraged state employees to conduct spoken and written business in Hindi exclusively and was in keeping with the politician’s populist platform. UP is the Indian state with the highest number of Hindi speakers as well as high unemployment, barring many people who do not have skills in English from work. During the campaign, the chief minister’s son attended an exclusive school in which English is the primary language of communication (Zurbuchen 1992).

22. This is not meant to imply that elsewhere in India ideological constructions are the same. Thomas Hansen reports that Marathi’s increasing association with Maharasthra and Maharashtrians rested, in part, on a competitive labor market specific to Bombay. Migrating there in the 1950s and 1960s, Marathi speakers met established groups such as “Muslim weavers from North India or literate South Indians whose skills in English gave them easier access to clerical jobs” (Hansen 2001:45). Hansen writes of the Hindu-chauvinist group Shiv Sena’s demonization of such speakers as well as high unemployment, barring many people who do not have skills in English from work. During the campaign, the chief minister’s son attended an exclusive school in which English is the primary language of communication (Zurbuchen 1992).

23. The slum is occupied primarily by Untouchables, or Dalits, literally “the downtrodden.” Kumar (1989:59–77) explains that when they are mentioned in the curriculum’s subject matter, Untouchables are generally derided as backward. Kancha Ilaiah, who describes himself and the community in which he was raised as Dalit, reflects on his own alienation from the materials provided by schooling:

What difference did it make to us whether we [Dalits] had an English textbook that talked about Milton’s Paradise Lost or Paradise Regained, or Shakespeare’s Othello or Macbeth, or Wordsworth’s poetry about English nature, or a Telugu textbook that talks about Kalidas’s Meghasandesham, Bummera Potanna’s Bhagavatam, or Nannaya and Tikkana’s Mahabharatam, except the fact that one textbook is written using twenty-six characters and the other fifty-six? We do not share the contents of either; we do not find our lives reflected in their narratives. We cannot locate them in our family settings. Without constant recourse to a dictionary neither makes any sense to us. [1996:177]

Notice that even though Ilaiah decries formal education’s exclusion of Dalits by the literate materials it uses, he nevertheless invokes a divide between English and Telugu (the official language of Andhra Pradesh), the only standardized varieties present in school. Corresponding languages in Banaras are English and Hindi, and Kumar (1989) confirms that these standard forms and representative literate materials serve to disadvantage and alienate Untouchables in the Hindi Belt.

24. The Doon School is known throughout India not only as an exemplary institution for instruction in English but also for the provision of a cosmopolitan stance. Sanjay Srivastava states, “The society in which it [the Doon School] thrives today has given those desires the form of imperatives of 'modern' citizenship and the School has come to be regarded as the prototype of the civil society itself” (1998:23).

25. Heller expresses her own surprise at hearing a song on the radio by the internationally known pop group Pet Shop Boys wherein lexical items of several Western European languages are included to highlight the value of multilingualism. The song, according to Heller, illustrates the possibility that multilingual productions are not necessarily ‘produced by marginalized groups aiming at fragmenting the unity of the dominant group, ’ but can be used as “a marker of elite status in the new economic order” (1999:270). Heller argues, however, that such developments must be contextualized. For example, she notes that the song emerges from socioeconomic shifts in Europe facilitating the formation of the European Union. The published elite commentary cited in this article reinforces Heller’s call to contextualize ideological refractions of multilingualism. Although the elites cited are themselves multilingual, they nevertheless focus on English spoken in India as a language dangerously influenced by indigenous Indian languages. They envision India as a place isolated by the English spoken there.

26. Jaqueline Urla notes that, in an effort to gain linguistic legitimacy, governments or would-be governments sometimes employ a census in which parameters of linguistic variation are narrowed. She states that in the case of Basque nationalism, “highlighting literacy and eliding dialects, the census categories refute the longstanding assumptions that Basque is not a fully modern language and that Basque speakers are not a single language community” (1993:831). Such censuses can then emerge as a token that confirms the iconic triad citizen, language, and nation.

27. Thus, Woolard’s example provides an instance in which language ideology, described by Shirley Brice Heath in the quote below to be typical of (dominant) U.S. citizens generally, has been mobilized when the promotion of a national language has been challenged:

The legacy of the language situation in the United States is … the rejection of an official choice of a national language or national institutions to regulate language decisions related to spelling, pronunciation, technical vocabulary, or grammar. Yet Americans overwhelmingly believe that English is the national tongue and that correctness in spelling, pronunciation, word choice, and usage, as well as facility in reading and writing English, are desirable goals for every U.S. citizen. [1981:6]

28. Scholars of sociolinguistics in India have provided an alternate vision to critiques based on images of multilingualism as confusion or mixing as interference. Pandit (1977, 1979), for example, argues that language maintenance is the norm in India (unlike in the West), such that displaced groups simply gain languages rather than assimilate. Aggarwal, however, challenges the notion of Indian plurilingualism, citing empirical studies contradicting Pandit’s assertion. Aggarwal calls for studies that examine ‘plurilingualism in India’ that take account of “the history and socio-cultural, economic and political dynamics of the multi-dimensionally diverse plurilingual settings in India” (1997:47). This article follows Aggarwal’s lead; critics continue to
publish diatribes against illegitimate language that place them in a particular ideological stance to the nation and language. 29. Who is elite varies across India by region, the political histories of particular states within India, and the economic histories of villages, cities, or regions of residence. Such factors interpolate with language practice in complex ways. For example, Braj Kachru notes that monolingual practice among Indian elites generally is almost nonexistent. Code switching and code mixing between English and indigenous languages such as Punjabi, Hindi, or Bengali is a normal feature of linguistic practice in many contexts for elites competent in English. Thus, regional elites have initiated the growth of regional varieties of English (Kachru 1992). I use Kachru’s observation to argue for the distinctiveness of the authors cited in this section of the article. Indeed, the regional elites who have fostered regional varieties of English described by Kachru would seemingly be the most salient targets of the authors cited herein, given their concerns about the influence of other languages on English. 30. This is true for racialized Puerto Ricans. When “Junk Spanish” is found in the discourse of whites, it has the potential to mark them positively (Hill 1998).

References cited


Gupta, Akhil


Haeri, Niloofar


Hansen, Thomas


Hansen, Thomas, and Finn Stepputat


Heath, Shirley Brice


Heller, Monica


Hill, Jane


Ilaih, Kancha


Jaffe, Alexandra


Jayaram, N.


Kachru, Braj


Kaviaraj, Sudipta


Keane, Webb


Khoubchandi, Lachman


King, Christopher


King, Robert


Krishnamurti, Bh.


Kumar, Krishna


Kumar, Nita


LaDouisa, Chaise


Leyveld, David


Mankekar, Purnima


Marriott, McKim

1976 Hindu Transactions: Diversity without Dualism. In Transaction and Meaning: Directions in the Anthropology of
Disparate markets • American Ethnologist


Masica, Colin


National Policy on Education


Orsini, Francesca


Prasad, H. Y. Sharada


Pattanayak, D. P.


Pinney, Christopher


Rajagopal, Arvind


Rai, Akos


Rajgopal, Arvind


Rajan, Rajeswari


Ramaswamy, Sumathi


Schifman, Harold


Shapiro, Michael, and Harold Schifman


Sheth, D. L.


Silverstein, Michael


Simon, Beth


Singh, Khushwant


Southworth, Franklin


Sridhar, Kamal


Srivastava, A. K.


Srivastava, Sanjay


Suraiya, Jug


Swigart, Leigh


Thapar, Romesh


Urciuoli, Bonnie


Urla, Jaqueline


Viswanathan, Gauri


Wadley, Susan


Woolard, Kathryn


accepted December 7, 2004
final version submitted January 4, 2005

Chaise LaDousa
Department of Anthropology
Southern Connecticut State University
501 Crescent Street
New Haven, CT 06515
ladousac1@southernct.edu